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(Im)politeness and emotion 
 
Andreas Langlotz and Miriam A. Locher 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the interconnectedness of emotions with (im)politeness from a 
theoretical and methodological perspective. Consider the following paraphrased 
examples, which all contain potentially face-challenging situations: 
 
(1) A wife asks her husband to open a window for her while both are guests at a dinner 
party in a relative’s house and the hostess is in a different room. This causes irritation in 
his wife. The husband, while acknowledging that the temperature is hot and that his 
wife has legitimate claims to get the window opened, first refuses to comply by referring 
to the host’s rights at granting permission to open a window in her own house. Once the 
host’s consent is won, he opens the window. (See Locher 2004, for a detailed 
discussion.) 
 
(2) Commentators of online newspaper articles often attack each other ad hominem rather 
than concentrating on a factual discussion. These face-attacks are loaded with 
emotionally charged vocabulary and often result in further rounds of face-aggravating 
behaviour. (For examples of English newspapers see, e.g. Neurauter-Kessels 2013; 
Langlotz and Locher 2012.) 
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(3) An interactant goes to a tourist office to enquire about accommodation. The interaction 
with the clerk proceeds ‘as usual’ and is not particularly noteworthy with respect to face-
enhancing or face-challenging behaviour. Instead, both interactants have established a 
face-maintaining stance that allows the interaction to run smoothly so that the 
expectations of both interactants are met. (See Langlotz 2015, for a detailed discussion.) 
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In all three examples we see human beings engaged in interaction who use language 
to achieve their aims. We argue that the examples all contain emotional, relational and 
socionormative elements. In (1) we witness the negotiation of rights and obligations of 
husbands, wives and hosts. Not complying with expectations about rights, or fulfilling 
rights, will trigger negative and positive emotions that influence the continuation of the 
exchange. In (2), we encounter conflictual behaviour, which triggers defence mechanisms 
that are emotionally loaded. In (3), we find a non-conflictual encounter, which, however 
is an interactional achievement in itself since both participants adhere to norms of what 
is expected of clerk and client in this particular encounter. Even here, we argue, emotions 
play a role. Furthermore, all examples serve as illustrations of how acquired knowledge of 
sociality and the connected sociocultural norms shape interactions and relationships. In 
this chapter, we will focus on emotions within interpersonal pragmatics with the aim to 
establish their role in the complex interplay of human interaction. 
As the study of emotions is a fundamental concern for studying humanity, it is not 
surprising that many scholarly disciplines have dedicated considerable efforts to theorising 
emotions. Giving a comprehensive overview of this field from philosophy to cognitive 
science is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Turner and Stets 2005; Turner 2007). 
Instead, we aim at touching upon important research strands throughout the chapter to 
establish the research interface that is fruitful for (im)politeness research and to outline 
better what we understand by emotions. In Sect. 2, we provide a schematic overview of 
systemic components involved in emotion. By means of this skeletal system we will situate 
central approaches to emotion and outline the position of interpersonal pragmatics 
relative to them. On the basis of this general overview, we then review contributions 
within the (im)politeness literature that have worked on emotions (Sect. 3). Since this 
discussion does not present a unified picture, we will use this literature review as a 
springboard to elaborate on three concerns that the research raises (Sect. 4): Cognition 
and emotions, sociality and emotions, and the communicative observables of emotions. 
How these fundamental links between emotion and interpersonal pragmatics pan out will 
then be illustrated by drawing on examples of interaction in Sect. 5. Finally, we offer 
concluding remarks and suggestions for further research paths in Sect. 6. 
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2. The fundamental links between emotion and interpersonal pragmatics 
 
The three scenarios described in the introduction may not have left you cold. While 
reading them, you may have shown emphatic or sympathetic reactions and felt some of 
the emotional states that the participants to these situations might have experienced 
themselves.1 Thus, although being absent to these situations the human imaginary power 
of thinking about possible experiential contexts holds the latent potential for triggering 
emotions associated with them. This informal insight points to the central role of emotions 
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1 Note that we use a broad notion of emotion that also includes concepts such as affect and feeling. A 
substantial definition follows below. Other studies have differentiated them (for an overview see Langlotz 
and Soltysik Monnet 2014). 
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in human and non-human life: they regulate the relationship of an experiencer to a given 
environment and mediate his/her/its orientation towards it (Damasio 1999, 2003). 
Emotions such as happiness, anger, love, disgust, embarrassment, shame or guilt can make 
us orient positively towards a given object, organism or person and approach them, or 
they can make us sense more negative feelings and cause us to shun away from them. 
Based on their emotional reactions, agents may thus perform a variety of (re)actions 
towards the environment ranging from destructive aggression to great happiness. This 
highly simplified system consisting of five fundamental components is illustrated by the 
bold terms in Fig. 12.1. 
Neurobiological research shows that basic ways of emoting can already be found in 
basic organisms such as Aplysia californica, a sea snail, which emits black ink when being 
molested (Damasio 1999, p. 70). With regard to the components (1)–(5), human beings 
are, of course, much more complex agents than the mollusc. 
 
(1) Extending their physiology (1a), human organisms have brains designed for 
complex cognitive capacities, including conceptualisation, memorisation, 
planning and decision-making (1b). 
(2) Humans are social beings living in complex physical (2a) and social environments 
(2b) that are shaped through sociocultural practices (2c). These practices are 
bound to social norms and conventions. Moreover, humans are highly conscious 
of themselves. To some extent, they can conceptualise their inner-psychological 
states to make them become part of their worlds of direct experience (2d). 
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Fig.12.1. Emotions as regulators of relationship between organism and environment. 
 
(3) Due to (2b) the most important connections between humans and their 
environments consists in social relationships (3b) ranging from dyadic 
engagements to differentiated roles within groups and societies. An individual’s 
position in his/her social environment is defined through degrees of 
status/power, familiarity and duration (short to long-term engagements) 
(Langlotz 2015). Having concepts of their own selves and their own feelings (3c), 
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humans also establish relationships to themselves and engage in identity 
construction. 
(4) Due to the complexity of their environments and social relationships, human 
beings possess a very broad range of emotions to regulate their behaviours (see, 
e.g. Plutchik 2003). 
(5) In their (re)actions, humans are not restricted to a repertoire of physical 
responses (5a). Being highly communicative beings and possessing the symbolic 
power of language, they can express and also describe emotions through an array 
of non-verbal and verbal cues (5b). Moreover, they may use language to 
conceptualise emotional states, to describe them and to talk about them through 
meta-comments (5c). 
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Several different approaches to and definitions of the concept of emotion exist. 
However, still ‘there is little consensus on what emotion is or is not’ (Barrett 1998, p. v, 
quoted in Schwarz-Friesel 2007, p. 43). In our view, this is mainly due to the differing ways 
in which different approaches to emotion have analysed, researched and interpreted the 
complex interaction between the components and subcomponents in (1)–(5). 
In neuropsychology the main focus has been on the connections between (1a), (2) and 
(4), i.e. on the neurophysiological status of emotions as part of the human ‘homeostasis 
machine’ (Damasio 1999, p. 55; see also Damasio 1994, 2003, 2004; James 1884; LeDoux 
1998). While the precise mechanisms underlying emotions as physiological reactions are 
not of central interest here, it is important to emphasise that these approaches underline 
the fundamental role for emotions in the architecture of human psychology and 
behaviour. Importantly, they show that rational thinking is not possible without the 
evaluative influence of emotional components and that higher-level cognitive capacities 
seem to be fundamentally shaped by these lower-level somatic survival mechanisms 
(Damasio 2003, pp. 145–9). 
In cognitive psychology, the complex interrelation between the environment (2), 
emotions (4) and cognition (1b) in the intelligent human regulation of organism–
environment interaction has been of central interest. Most importantly, appraisal theory 
proposes that emotions are triggered by the cognitive interpretation of a stimulus event 
(Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Scherer et al. 2001). These evaluations (positive vs. negative) 
then lead to emotional arousal. Unlike neuropsychology, appraisal theory thus stresses 
the importance of cognitive interpretations (1b) of the world of experience over the prior 
presence of physiological arousal (1a). 
Sociological theories of emotion have been primarily concerned with the links between 
(2b), (3), and (4), i.e. how emotions are linked to patterns of social organisation and how 
they are involved in relationship building (3b). Among others, dramaturgical theories stand 
in a Goffmanian tradition and are interested in how ‘individuals make dramatic 
presentations and engage in strategic actions directed by a cultural script’ (Turner and 
Stets 2005, p. 26). In this tradition we find a strong interest in sociocultural norms (2c) and 
strategic orientations towards them, including emotional impression management 
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(Goffman 1967; Hochschild 1979, 1983). Symbolic interactionist theories place their 
central focus on how individuals seek to confirm their self-conceptions and identities (2d), 
i.e. they wish to verify the emotional relationship to themselves in interaction with others 
(3c): 
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When self is verified by others responding to self in a manner that is consistent with self’s 
own view, the person experiences positive emotions, such as pride and satisfaction. When 
self is not confirmed, however, the incongruity between self-directed behavior and the 
responses of others generates negative emotions such as distress, anxiety, anger, shame, 
and guilt. (Turner and Stets 2005, p. 29) 
 
Finally, social constructionist approaches, as for example proposed by Harré (1986), have 
opposed biological and psychological theories, claiming that emotions are not empirically 
measurable objects of analysis but socially constructed entities that are highly culture 
specific. Most importantly, they propose that culture-specific ways of speaking about 
emotions (5c) shape culture-specific ideologies of what they are. A similar approach is 
taken in anthropological studies, which are interested in how complex culture-specific 
forms of performing and speaking about emotions and emotionality (5a)–(5c) shape 
emotions (4), social and cultural environments (2b, 2c), relationships (3b) and culture-
specific identities (3c) (Wilce 2009; Wierzbicka 1994). 
In communication studies, (1b), (2) and (3) are also highly important. However, unlike 
the previously mentioned approaches, communication studies start from (5b) and are 
interested in how emotional communicative cues are used to express emotions in 
different types of communication (e.g. family, marital, conflict, business or intercultural 
communication) and how these forms of emotional communication influence 
relationships (3b) and self-concepts (3c) within such contexts. Communication studies are 
also interested in how emotional communication can be managed to improve 
communication between interactants. 
With regard to language-related fields of study distinct from linguistic pragmatics and 
(im)politeness research, emphasis has primarily been on the verbal component of (5b). 
The Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric has focused on how verbal pathos can be used to 
influence the orators’ relationship to their audience (3b) and thus use language to cause 
changes in (2b) or (2c) (see Micheli 2008). In literary and cultural studies, different styles 
of articulating emotionality in combination with the question of how such styles shape 
ideologies and conceptions of what emotions (4) are have been of central interest 
(Langlotz and Soltysik Monnet 2014). In linguistics, the structure of verbalising the 
emotional component of experience has been of recent interest (Bednarek 2008; Foolen 
2012; Oster 2012; Schwarz-Friesel 2007). 
Where can interpersonal pragmatics be positioned within this skeletal overview? 
Interpersonal pragmatics is centrally interested in how interactants use language to 
construct, negotiate, maintain, challenge and change social relationships. With regard to 
Fig. 12.1, the use of emotional cues (5b) as well 
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as emotional meta-comments (5c) for the emotional regulation of interpersonal 
relationships (3b) thus constitutes the central object of analysis with regard to linking 
emotions to (im)politeness (see Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 99, Fig. 2). However, as the 
previous literature review has shown, we should also be strongly interested in the impact 
of emotions on cognitive processes of interpretation and the impact of cognition on 
emotional reactions (1b) (Locher and Langlotz 2008; Culpeper 2010; Culpeper et al. 2014). 
In addition, the construction of relationships must always be understood relative to 
sociocultural environments and interactional contexts in which they take place (2c). 
Finally, as the idea of ‘face’ is linked to the conceptualisation of the self (3c) and 
corresponding inner-psychological feeling states (2d), these dimensions involved in 
activating situated identities in relational work also play a central role in the complex 
system of connections between emotion and the management of (im)politeness in 
relational work (Langlotz 2010). This leads us to a short overview of research foci on 
emotions and (im)politeness in (im)politeness research. 
 
3. Emotions and (im)politeness in (im)politeness research 
 
It would be a gross misrepresentation to say that the importance of the role of 
emotions and feelings has not been pointed to within (im)politeness research. However, 
many of the most popular works on politeness mention emotions only in passing and do 
not discuss their influence or role within interpersonal pragmatics in great detail. For 
example, Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 67, 68) primarily mention the display of emotions 
or lack of control of emotions as potentially face threatening and refer to the 
‘communication of affect’ (display rules2 and emotional stance) when claiming that 
‘[i]nsofar as the display of affect is socially constructed, with cultural and situational 
expectations about what and how feelings should be displayed, work here links directly 
with our discussions of [face-threatening acts, positive politeness strategies, and cultural 
ethos]’ (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 28). They maintain that studying how ‘appropriate 
levels of affect’ are conveyed is of concern for linguists studying politeness. Leech’s 
Pragmatics of Politeness (2014, pp. 4–9) does not include mention of the involvement of 
emotions 
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in the assessment of politeness as one of his proposed ‘eight characteristics of politeness’ 
(see also Leech 1983), but does refer to the role of affect and familiarity as being part of 
Brown and Levinson’s D variable (horizontal distance) in his discussion of requests (p. 139). 
Kienpointner (2008, pp. 246–7) further argues that, along with proposing that affect and 
familiarity in themselves are important factors when assessing the weightiness of an 
imposition, the variables power and distance proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987) also 
contain elements of emotions. This is because the relational history of interactants and 
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communicative management of facial expressions. Communicators may change the expressive surface of 
their emotional states by simulating, inhibiting, intensifying, de-intensifying or masking their actual emotions 
in order to follow culture-specific norms of appropriate emotional display (see Sect. 4.2; Langlotz and Locher 
2013). 
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meeting face-concerns against the backdrop of local expectations about roles in 
interaction have a fundamentally emotional component (see, e.g. Arndt and Janney 1985). 
Screening the literature, we also find a number of contributions that study meta-
comments about relational work that contain emotional assessments and emotional cues 
within interaction in order to gain a better understanding of breaches and maintenance of 
norms (for examples in this tradition, see Chang and Haugh 2011; Culpeper 2010, 2011; 
Culpeper et al. 2014; Kienpointner 2008; Langlotz and Locher 2012, 2013; Locher and 
Langlotz 2008; Locher and Koenig 2014; Ruhi 2009; Ruhi and Isik-Güler 2007; Spencer-
Oatey 2011). 
It is apparent, then, that the literature refers to emotions, on the one hand, as being 
displayed and conveyed, and, on the other hand, as being taken into account when 
choosing and assessing relational strategies. In this way they are thus part of creating and 
processing relational meaning. Consider what Culpeper (2011, p. 60) argues in his work on 
impoliteness: 
 
Displaying emotions such as contempt or anger has nothing in itself to do with impoliteness. 
However, somebody displaying great contempt for and anger at someone and doing so 
publicly may be judged […] to have acted in an inappropriately and unfairly hurtful way […], 
causing an emotional reaction such as embarrassment or anger […]. (Culpeper 2011, p. 60) 
 
Culpeper here refers both to the explicit conveying of emotions, i.e. making manifest to 
an interlocutor how the speaker feels, and to the reactions to this display, which are 
emotional in turn. The former concerns the study of a surface structure, while the second 
is more fundamentally concerned with theorising how emotions cognitively contribute to 
relational understandings. Culpeper (2011, pp. 60–61) draws on Haidt’s (2003) work on 
moral emotions and especially elaborates on the link between face and emotions 
(Goffman 1967). The latter is also of particular concern in Spencer-Oatey’s (2005) work. In 
her discussion of rapport management (Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2011), she shows that 
‘emotional reactions’ of the speaker and addressee play a fundamental role in the 
negotiation of face concerns (see Fig. 12.2). 
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Fig. 12.2. ‘The base of dynamic perceptions of rapport’ (from: Spencer-Oatey 2005, p. 116). 
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This is true for expectancy reactions (positively, neutral or negatively eventful) and in what 
she terms ‘emotional reactions’ (joy, surprise, anger, sadness and their subgroups) in the 
dynamic perception of rapport. 
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In Garcés-Conejos Blitvich’s (2013) discussion of the connection of the concept of face 
and identity, she argues that both concepts should be linked to emotions (see also Ruhi 
2007, pp. 140–1, 2009, p. 170): 
 
Identity verification is according to Burke and Stets (2009) a central process in identity 
construction […]. Identities can be verified, partially verified or not verified by other agents. 
Verification/non-verification is associated with very positive/negative emotions. These 
emotions, which are usually associated with face, as Spencer-Oatey argues (2007: 644 see 
above), are also crucially connected with identity. Those positive/negative emotions 
associated with the maintenance/enhancement/threat to face can then be associated as 
well with the verification/non-verification of an identity. Thus, (im)politeness evaluations 
can be tied to identity, not just to face. After all, a way to get people very upset is to tell 
them (explicitly or implicitly) that they are not who they claim to be or think they are. A 
person may feel very offended if somebody whom s/he considers a friend introduces 
him/her to others simply as a colleague or an acquaintance. Positive feelings, traditionally 
associated with politeness assessments, may result when a friend tells you that you are 
more like a sister than a friend to her. In both cases, (im)politeness may ensue as a result of 
the construction of a given social identity for an individual. (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, p. 
17) 
 
Identity construction, in this line of reasoning, is the outcome of relational 
work/facework/rapport management that entails the assessment of whether 
expectations about emotional orientation and fulfilling of roles are met in situ (see also 
Locher 2008). 
When Haugh et al. (2013, p. 4) assess the research scope of interpersonal pragmatics, 
they identify three areas of interest: (1) interpersonal relations; (2) interpersonal attitudes 
and emotions; and (3) interpersonal evaluations (see also Culpeper and Haugh 2014, p. 
197): 
 
(1) ‘The primary area of concern in interpersonal pragmatics is naturally 
interpersonal relations, which encompasses “mutual social connections amongst 
people that are mediated by interaction, including power, intimacy, roles, rights 
and obligations” (Culpeper and Haugh [2014, p. 197]).’ (emphasis in original) 
(2) ‘[T]he area of interpersonal attitudes, which encompasses “perspectives, usually 
value-laden and emotionally charged, on others that are mediated by interaction, 
including generosity, sympathy, like/dislike, disgust, fear and anger” (Culpeper 
and Haugh [2014, p. 197]),’ and the ‘area of 
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interpersonal emotions, which encompasses embodied feelings or state-of mind 
often characterised by participants as “irrational and subjective, unconscious 
rather than deliberate [and] genuine rather than artificial” (Edwards 1999: 273).’ 
(emphasis in original) 
(3) The area of ‘interpersonal evaluations, which involve “appraisals or assessment 
of persons, or our relationships with those persons, which influence the way we 
think and feel about those persons and relationships, and consequently 
sometimes what we do” (Kádár and Haugh 2013: 61).’3 (emphasis in original) 
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While in area (2) emotions are explicitly mentioned, (1) and (3) also involve emotions, 
since they are part of relationship building and appraisals are cognitively linked to 
emotional reactions. As the authors point out, these three levels are in fact interrelated 
and ‘in practice the analysis of face and (im)politeness is often necessarily intertwined’ 
(Haugh et al. 2013, p. 4). The same comment is valid for emotions as they play a role on 
all three levels, too.  
What we take from this overview is that we have to be especially aware of what level 
of study we are referring to when making claims about emotions and their roles within 
interpersonal pragmatics. We propose three areas that can be disentangled to better 
understand the nature of emotions:4 
 
- Cognition and emotions: What are emotions and what role do they play in 
cognitive processes of sense-making? 
- Sociality and emotions: What is the connection of emotions and interpersonal 
pragmatics? What is at stake when emotions come into play (e.g. identity 
construction and relationship negotiations)? 
- Communicative observables of emotions: While the discussion of the first two 
areas is of a fundamental, theoretical nature, analysts in the field of interpersonal 
pragmatics only have direct access to what is observable in interaction (e.g. 
emotion display rules, emotion meta-comments, words expressing emotional 
connotations; visible somatic states, etc.). What does the literature offer us as tools 
to describe surface structures of emotional stance for a systematic description? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
↑ 
297 
 
We will flesh these areas out in Sect. 4 by drawing on further literature on language 
and emotions and other disciplines working on emotions. How these levels are connected 
will be illustrated in Sect. 5. 
 
4. The links of emotions to cognition, sociality and communicative observables 
 
Before we elaborate on the three areas raised in the previous section, we need to posit 
that emotions and emotionality cannot be restricted to internal physiological states of 
anger, fear, etc. Instead, they are multicomponential ‘syndromes’ that, according to 
Plutchik (2003, pp. 108–11), derive their conceptual complexity from three definitional 
perspectives: (a) structural, (b) sequential and (c) derivational. These distinctions are 
useful in better understanding the positions on emotions taken within and across the 
three areas outlined below. 
The structural perspective on emotions tries to compare different types of emotions 
and their relationship to one another. For instance, according to Plutchik’s (1962, 1980, 
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4 Arndt and Janney (1985, p. 286) propose to study ‘(1) emotions generally, (2) how they are expressed, 
suppressed or otherwise modified in face-to-face speech [our third point], and (3) how emotive expression 
affects transitory interpersonal relationships [this is part of our second point].’ Arndt and Janney (1985, p. 
282) also argue that ‘[t]he domain of relevance in studying or teaching politeness, we suggest, is emotive 
communication—the communication of transitory attitudes, feelings and other affective states’. They thus 
clearly highlight the importance of emotions within any (im)politeness framework. 
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2003) famous multidimensional structural model, emotions can be metaphorically 
compared to a spectrum of colours and arranged according to an emotional ‘colour-
wheel’. The wheel contains eight basic emotions (anger, anticipation, joy, trust, fear, 
surprise, sadness, disgust) that have a certain similarity and polarity. For instance, joy is 
more similar to trust and anticipation than to fear and it stands in polar opposition to 
sadness. Like colours, these emotions can also vary along a range of intensity. Thus, joy 
ranges from serenity to ecstasy, while sadness lies on a continuum between pensiveness 
and grief. Finally, the basic emotions with their different degrees of intensity can also be 
blended, which results in secondary and tertiary emotions. According to Plutchik (2003, p. 
105), contempt can be seen as a blend between the primary emotions disgust and anger. 
A similar classificatory grid for the structural dimension of emotions is offered by Schwarz-
Friesel (2007, see Table 12.1). 
 
Table 12.1. Classificatory grid for emotion categories, based on Schwarz-Friesel (2007, Ch. 3.3, see also 
Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 90). 
 
Emotion: 
A. Type and function:  emotion categories 
B. Quality: positive vs. negative evaluation 
C. Intensity: strong - weak continuum 
D. Duration: permanent vs. temporary 
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It is important to emphasise that such structural models have been severely criticised 
in anthropological, anthropological linguistic and social constructionist research (see, e.g. 
Harré 1986; Wierzbicka 1994). These researchers claim that different ‘structural’ emotion 
categories must be seen as highly culture specific rather than universal. It is, however, 
beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on this controversy more profoundly. 
From a sequential perspective on emotions, it is not the structural distinctions between 
different emotion types that are of interest, but how emotions are part of complex 
behavioural processes. Every type of emotion, as classified from a structural perspective, 
can be seen to establish a complex behavioural sequence, which turns emotions into 
intricately distributed and dynamic phenomena. For example, the emotion ‘contempt’ 
involves the complex sequence of seeing or experiencing the behaviour or actions of a 
person, evaluating these actions as immoral, despicable or inappropriate, activating a 
corresponding physiological state of contempt, leading to the potential overt behaviour of 
a sneer or snub and avoiding him or her. Often such action tendencies can also be 
regulated. For instance, a politician may shake hands with a competitor from a different 
party despite wishing to dodge them. In accord with Planalp (1999, pp. 11–34; see also 
Scherer 1984), we can thus present the following sequential model for the emotional 
process of developing contempt for a person who speaks, for example, against the 
protection of sharks in Western Australia5 in Table 12.2 (see also Langlotz and Locher 2012, 
p. 1595). 
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It is important to note that from the linguistic perspective of interpersonal pragmatics, 
action tendencies as in column 4 in Table 12.2 comprise all the communicative dimensions 
of expressing and describing emotions 5a–c in 
 
Table 12.2. Sequential model of the emotional processes for ‘contempt’. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stimuli 
(object, event) 
Appraisal 
processes 
Physiological 
changes 
Action 
tendencies 
Regulation 
Offender shows 
a special 
behaviour, e.g. 
he/she says: ‘I 
think that all 
killer sharks 
should be 
hunted down’ 
Interpretation of 
this statement 
as immoral or 
inappropriate 
Potential 
reactions 
related to 
the basic 
emotion of 
disgust 
(bodily 
symptoms 
of repulsion) 
Avoid the 
person, give 
him/her a 
snort, tell him/ 
her what one 
thinks of such 
attitudes 
towards 
animals 
Keep one’s 
calm, enter 
into a debate 
about animals 
rights, etc. 
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Fig. 12.1. Thus, stimuli for emotions and the reactions to these stimuli in human affairs are 
communicative in many cases and involve negative and positive appraisals within the 
communicative situation (see Culpeper 2010). 
The derivational perspective on emotions (Plutchik 2003, pp. 108–11) claims that 
emotions are part of derivational processes on phylogenetic, ontogenetic as well as 
psychological levels. The human sneer can be seen to be a phylogenetic derivative of the 
wolfish snarl (Darwin 1872). Similarly, emotional patterns that are part of baby–parent 
interaction can be reactivated later for adult–adult interaction. For instance, baby talk is 
often part of lovers’ talk. Finally, personality traits and psychological disorders are also 
derived from more basic emotional states. Thus, a timid personality is based on fear and 
may lead to dependent-avoidant disorders. 
These three perspectives on emotions play a role in debates and controversies that 
also reverberate for discussions concerning the link between emotions and (im)politeness. 
We can now turn to a more detailed discussion of the links between cognition and 
emotions, sociality and emotions, and their communicative observables as distilled from 
the literature review above and relate them to research interests in interpersonal 
pragmatics. 
 
4.1 Emotions and cognition 
 
In our view, the link between emotion and cognition must be regarded from two 
different perspectives: (a) the fundamental links between emotion and cognition in 
emotional processes and (b) the role of cognition for framing expectations about 
appropriate behaviours in a specific situation. These connections between emotion and 
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cognition can be discussed relative to the derivational as well as the sequential 
perspectives introduced above. 
Extensively discussing the case of Phineas Gage—a railway worker who suffered a 
massive lesion in his prefrontal cortex, i.e. a brain centre that is very important for linking 
emotions and concepts—and relating this case to further neurocognitive evidence, 
Damasio (1994) presents very strong neurobiological arguments for the impact of 
emotions on cognitive processes of decision making. The empirical evidence shows that 
whenever we reason about a specific situation, prior emotional experiences with 
comparable situations strongly influence how we appraise the situation at hand (Damasio 
2003, p. 149). With regard to our example (1), the husband’s hesitation may thus be 
explained on the basis of his uneasy feelings about the situation. He cannot reason about 
the tricky constellation without emoting about it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
↑ 
300 
Damasio (1999) presents these insights in a complex sequential model of emotional 
processing that implies an evolutionary perspective on how consciously perceptible 
emotional states have developed from evolutionarily more basic, uncontrollable and 
subconscious emotional reactions. In a discussion of the pragmatics of communicative 
choice making, Beeman (2014) reveals that such automatic emotional processes have an 
impact on the stylistic ‘decisions’ taken by a speaker. In a highly abbreviated form, 
Damasio’s neuropsychological process model suggests that perceived stimuli directly 
activate emotion-triggering sites such as the amygdala, which themselves activate 
emotion-execution sites that cause uncontrollable bodily changes: facial expressions, 
increased heart rate, skin reaction, body posture, emotion-specific behaviours (see James 
1884). Human beings are able to perceive and conceptualise such physiological and 
physical changes in our own bodies (Damasio 2003, p. 30). Thus, when we feel uneasy 
about something, we are able to perceive a change in our bodily state in combination with 
the thoughts that are momentarily associated with this state. 
Through personal experience, certain concepts may become automatically linked with 
emotional reactions, which makes it possible to activate positive or negative feelings by 
thinking about a certain constellation without directly experiencing it. For instance, we can 
think about our colleagues and feel happy when doing so because we have had many 
happy encounters with them. Of course, such feelings may change, when more negative 
experiences modify the associative patterns between the concepts of our colleagues and 
the less pleasant bodily states experiences when they treated us badly. 
Damasio’s neurocognitive theory is compatible with the cognitive psychological 
theories of appraisal (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Scherer et al. 2001). They purport that 
emotions are triggered by cognitive processes of interpreting, i.e. appraising a given 
situation. Unlike Damasio’s process model, which is grounded in the basic physiology of 
emotional reactions, appraisal theorists thus put their central emphasis on the different 
cognitive dimensions underlying the evocation of emotional/feeling states. Such appraisal 
processes are determined by our relationship to a specific situation, the goals we have in 
a specific situation as well as how relevant the situation is to our lives (Lazarus 1991). With 
regard to example (2) in our introduction, we will probably react rather soberly to a 
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negative comment in an online newspaper commentary forum if we are occasional users 
of this service, if it is not our central goal to convince others of the correctness of our 
opinion and if the discussed issue is not very important to us. However, strong negative 
emotions such as contempt or anger would be triggered if we are frequent commentators 
and pursue the mission of convincing other readers because the argument 
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at hand is highly relevant to our worldview. Accordingly, appraisal theory would predict 
that higher degrees of personal involvement, goal satisfaction or goal interruption as well 
as the personal relevance of a situation would trigger stronger emotions and feelings than 
lower ones. 
Beyond having an intimate connection with emotional processing, cognition is also 
important for memorising and activating pre-established knowledge about appropriate 
context-specific behaviours, including situationally appropriate emotional behaviours 
(Andersen and Guerrero 1998, pp. 64–65; Locher and Langlotz 2008). Such knowledge is 
acquired through socialization (see Cook and Burdelski (Chap. 18), this volume). According 
to Hochschild (1979, 1983) two types of socially appropriate emotional behaviour must be 
distinguished. On the one hand, we must learn feeling rules, i.e. we must learn how to feel 
in a specific situation. For example, medical doctors must learn to express empathy with 
their patients without, however, feeling the same as them all the time (see also Locher 
and Koenig 2014; Locher 2017). Flight attendants must learn to project being in charge 
and positive even in highly stressful periods. Such feeling rules are closely related to 
display rules (Ekman and Friesen 1975). According to Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 54): 
‘these products of emotional socialization involve a learned response that modifies 
spontaneous emotional displays to be socially appropriate’. Thus, flight attendants must 
put on a smile even if they feel exhausted, whereas doctors should signal empathy about 
their patients’ fate even if they cannot and should not feel sad about all their patients’ 
misfortunes. The knowledge about feeling rules and display rules is stored in the form of 
corresponding cognitive schemata that are activated for judging and appraising the 
appropriateness of a given social situation. Thus, with regard to example (3) in the 
introduction, we know that a service transaction in a tourist office is linked to a certain 
(often highly culture-specific) transactional style. This style also involves expectations 
about appropriate emotional displays. In Switzerland, for instance, one would expect a 
certain degree of friendliness as signalled through a positively intonated voice and an 
occasional smile (see Langlotz 2015). But extreme displays of happiness as well as signals 
of annoyance or disinterest would violate the transactional norms for emotional displays. 
Such behaviours, which deviate from established feeling and display rules, would violate 
the expectations represented in culture-specific frames and activity types and most likely 
lead to negative appraisals. In other words, feeling rules and display rules provide 
emotion-specific benchmarks for appraisal processes. 
For (im)politeness research the interface between emotion and cognition should 
therefore be of central interest with regard to the following perspectives. First, 
researchers should be interested in finding out how 
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communicative situations and communicative acts lead to positive or negative appraisals 
and how such appraisals lead to emotion-driven (communicative) reactions. Research 
stressing this central role of appraisals in reactions to (im)politeness has been conducted 
by Culpeper and his colleagues (Culpeper 2011; Culpeper et al. 2014). Second, scholars 
working in interpersonal pragmatics should investigate the norms of emotionality (feeling 
rules) and emotional display (display rules) that specific speech communities associate 
with particular activity types. Breaching such expectations will again lead to negative 
appraisals and, in many cases, to negative emotional reactions including (im)politeness 
and conflict. 
 
4.2 Emotions and sociality 
 
Emotions are both personal and social phenomena. From the perspective of 
communication studies, Planalp (1999) claims: 
 
The mere fact that we communicate emotion implies that emotion itself is both personal 
and social. If our feelings were entirely personal, with no shared meaning and no 
implications for others, there would be no need to communicate them. Emotions might help 
us as individuals to orient to important concerns and guide our actions, but they would not 
interest anybody else. At the opposite extreme, there would also be no need to 
communicate emotions if they were entirely social. If members of a community felt in 
unison, emotions would serve to orient the group to common concerns and to coordinate 
behavior, but there would be no individual variation from one member to another. But 
emotions are neither purely personal nor purely social; they are both. Through 
communication, our personal emotional experiences are made available to others in society, 
and at the same time, social expectations about emotion are made known to us as 
individuals. Communication is a way of bridging the gap between the personal and the 
social sides of emotion. (Planalp 1999, p. 135, emphasis in original) 
 
What we take from this quotation is that emotions have a fundamentally personal as well 
as social side—an observation which we can easily link to the current debate around the 
concept of face and identity construction. Both face and identity are bound to personal 
evaluations but are also shaped by communicative processes and thus turn into social 
phenomena (see also, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, p. 17; this volume). Emotions are 
intricately linked to sociality along three derivational levels: (i) phylogenetic, (ii) 
ontogenetic and (iii) social interactional. Many of the theories that deal with the 
construction of sociality along these levels are fundamentally important for 
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(Im)politeness. They show that emotion management is a crucial element for the symbolic 
construction of relationships.  
From a phylogenetic perspective of human evolution emotions cannot be merely 
regarded as internal control mechanisms that manage the interaction of an organism with 
its environment. As Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 50) put it, emotions evolved ‘as 
relatively universal communication systems that promoted the group survival of humans’. 
A very similar argument is also put forward in Turner’s evolutionary theory of human 
sociality as grounded in emotionality (Turner 2000): 
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Every facet of human endeavor is emotional. Without emotions, humans could not choose 
among behavioral alternatives, see themselves as objects, engage in face-to-face 
interpersonal behavior, organize groups, and construct large scale institutional systems 
cutting across entire societies and, today, a global network of societies. As much as language 
and the complex cultural systems that are made possible by language, humans’ emotional 
capacities are what make patterns of human organization viable. (Turner 2000, p. 119) 
 
Turner’s theory puts forward that our biological ancestors were rather poorly equipped 
when they were forced to leave the arboreal habitats (due to retreat of tropical forests) 
and when they had to become adapted to the more open space of the African savanna. 
This pressure caused in hominoids the ‘reorganization and elaboration of subcortical 
limbic structures, and their rewiring to neocortical and brain-stem systems, so as to 
produce an animal that could use and read a wide variety of emotional cues for enhanced 
social bonding’ (Turner 2000, p. 20). Simply put, hominoids managed to survive because 
the development of highly differentiated emotional communicative skills allowed them to 
live in social groups that were strong and organised enough to face the odds of the savanna 
(see also, Baumeister and Leary 1995, p. 497). Emotional communication allowed them to 
produce positive and negative sanctions that helped them manage interpersonal 
relationships before language existed (Turner 2000, pp. 47–52). Such emotionally loaded 
social sanctions thus allowed hominoids to influence their communicative partners’ 
orientation towards the social environment. 
Moreover, the emotional repertoire had to be linked to moral codes (Turner 2000, pp. 
52–6). Moral codes are expectations of appropriate behaviours including prescriptions and 
proscriptions. As cultural constructs, they have the power of compensating the absence of 
genetically endowed bioprograms for social behaviour. Moral coding makes the 
sociocultural management of emotions possible and corresponding interaction rituals 
(frames, including  
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feeling and display rules) are the communicative solution for implementing moral codes 
in socially appropriate behaviours. In this sense, interaction rituals are the cultural 
substitute for instinctive social behaviours. 
This phylogenetic perspective is also reflected in the ontogenetic development of 
children and their bonding to their caretakers. As the research by Trevarthen and his 
colleagues has shown (Bråten 2007; Bråten and Trevarthen 2007; Trevarthen 1999, 2002; 
Powers and Trevarthen 2009), newborns are highly sensitive to emotional signals (facial 
expressions, pitch and force of voice) and pre-linguistic babies are able to establish basic 
communicative bonds to and empathy with their parents through emotional cueing from 
the age of two months onwards: 
 
[M]icro-analyses of proto-conversations with two-month-olds have revealed that infants are 
endowed with a cerebral system that enables direct perception of interests and feelings in 
an other person and responsive attunement permitting delicate, emotionally regulated 
engagements. (Bråten and Trevarthen 2007, p. 21) 
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Emotional communication can thus be taken as an ontologically basic form of 
intersubjective engagement (Foolen et al. 2012). Emotional communication is highly 
important for the generation of empathy, which can be considered the emotional ‘glue’ of 
sociality (DeWaal 2007). This insight is also supported by modern neurobiological research 
(Bauer 2005). The importance of emotional cues in interpersonal interaction is also 
evidenced by Tronick’s (2005) still face experiment, which shows how the absence of 
emotional signaling destroys the social bonds between babies and their mothers and 
causes great distress in them. Therefore, the socioemotional roots constitute the 
foundation for further dialogic and interactional competence including the complex 
management of relationships through language. Humans have a ‘need for frequent, 
affectively pleasant interactions with a few other people in the context of a temporally 
stable and enduring framework of affective concern for each other’s welfare’ (Baumeister 
and Leary 1995, p. 497). Following Plutchik’s derivational perspective on emotions, we 
therefore claim that the emotional component in human social interaction and 
communication remains quintessential for the management of interpersonal relationships 
throughout an individual’s life (see Arndt and Janney 1985, p. 282). This leads us to the 
social interactional links between emotions and human sociality. 
The link between emotions and human sociality is highly reciprocal. On the one hand, 
as the phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives suggest, emotions are the glue for social 
bonding and give the edge to acts of social sanctioning (see Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997). 
On the other hand, interpersonal relationships also constitute the most important source 
for emotions. Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 64) argue that ‘the primary 
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Table 12.3. Emotions and their social-interactional elicitors (summarised from Andersen and Guerrero 1998). 
 
Emotion: Social elicitor: 
Happiness/joy Sharing happy and euphoric states with others  
(non-social antecedents are rare) 
Love/affection Shared times and experiences with partner  
(unrequited love causes distress) 
Pride Positive self-evaluation based on other’s approval 
Anger Other’s interference with one’s personal goals is the most 
frequent source of anger 
Communicative moves of others: insults, criticism, rejection 
Fear/anxiety Instigation through threats 
Fear of presenting oneself to others/interacting with others 
Sadness 
Grief 
Depression 
Sadness is mainly caused by social interaction. 
Grief is caused by loss of relationship. 
Depression is associated with social isolation. 
Jealousy Central social emotion: caused by real, anticipated, or 
imagined interaction of close friend or partner with third party 
Guilt 
Shame 
Embarrassment 
Self-conscious emotions 
Result from social interaction, i.e. transgressions of norms and 
their appraisal by oneself and the interactional partners 
 
Elicitor of emotions is interpersonal interaction. […]. Moreover, people often strategically 
induce emotional states in others as a way of achieving interpersonal goals.’ In their meta-
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analysis, they discuss how a number of emotions are triggered and elicited through social 
interaction (Table 12.3). 
As Table 12.3 shows, communication as a source of emotion thus involves a number of 
aspects that are of direct relevance for relational work and (im)politeness and provide a 
sharper picture of how emotional reactions and feeling states are tied to social interaction 
and corresponding norms. With a view to the social elicitors, the process model of emotion 
can be given a social interactional reinterpretation (Table 12.4). 
This social reinterpretation of the sequential model of emotions leads us to the 
problem of how emotions are communicated through emotional cues. 
The perspective presented in this section thus ties in with the connection between 
emotion and cognition discussed above. When analysing acts of (im)politeness, 
researchers should pay close attention to the social-interactional causes of (im)polite 
behaviours and how these causes affect the interactants’ emotional orientation to the 
current speech activity, their communicative partners and the negotiation and 
understanding of roles.6 It is this link 
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Table 12.4. Sequential model of the social side of emotional processes. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stimuli: 
social-
interactional 
causes 
Social- 
normative 
appraisals 
relative to 
personal goals 
and moral 
codes 
Socially 
determined 
physiological 
changes and 
feeling 
states 
Socially 
expected action 
tendencies, 
actions, and 
expressions for 
specific roles 
within social 
practices 
Social-normative 
regulatives = 
Display rules 
Customer is 
confronted 
with a harsh 
service 
provider. 
As customer 
wishes to be 
treated in a 
friendly 
manner, this 
conduct is 
considered 
inappropriate. 
Customer 
feels 
annoyance. 
The feeling rules 
of the social 
situation 
demand a 
‘balanced’ form 
of emotional 
display. This is 
in 
conflict with the 
customer’s 
current 
emotional state. 
The customer 
may 
inhibit the 
display of 
his/her 
anger or let the 
emotion out, 
thereby socially 
sanctioning the 
service 
provider’s 
unfriendly 
behaviour. 
 
between sociality and emotions that allows us to reiterate the importance of research that 
is concerned with the link between face, emotions and identity construction within 
interpersonal pragmatics (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Locher 2008; Ruhi 2007, 2009; 
Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2011), as exemplified in the block quotation by Garcés-Conejos 
Blitvich (2013, p. 17) in Sect. 3. 
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and negative feelings’. Their framework outlines how emotion-related parameters, such as confidence, 
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4.3 Communicative observables of emotions 
 
As the juxtaposition of the hidden, personal side of emotion, with the social side of 
emotion suggests, the communicative sharing of emotional states is centrally determined 
through complex patterns of emotional signalling. We can distinguish two communicative 
perspectives through which emotions become observable for linguistic analysis: (i) 
emotional cues as they are produced in interpersonal interaction and (ii) meta-comments 
on and descriptions of internal emotional states. 
With regard to (i), interactants combine emotional cues from different communicative 
modalities (verbal, vocal, facial, bodily) in dynamic conversational exchanges (see Arndt 
and Janney 1985; Planalp 1998; Döveling et al. 2010; Micheli 2008, pp. 5–6; Tables 12.5 
and 12.6). 
From the perspective of interpersonal pragmatics, it is of central interest how 
participants signal their emotional stances to their interlocutors, and how these signals 
are taken up by the recipient in order to analyse the 
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Table 12.5. Planalp’s (1998) overview of emotional cues (see Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 94). 
 
Class of cues: Forms of realisation: 
vocal cues voice quality: low, loud, slow, fast, trembling, high-pitched, 
monotonous, animate voice 
verbal cues language-specific emotion vocabularies  
metaphors 
speech acts 
emotional discourse practices, e.g. therapeutic discourse 
body cues animated, energetic movement 
physical actions: throwing things, making threatening 
movements, kissing, caressing 
gait: walking heavily, lightly, arm swing, length/speed of stride 
body posture: stiff/rigid, droopy, upright 
hands/arms gestures: hand emblems, clenching hands or fists 
physiological cues Blushing, pupil dilation, heart rate, breathing, skin 
temperature 
facial cues Facial expressions of emotions through forehead and 
eyebrows, eyes and eyelids, and the lower face (mouth, lips, 
labionasal folds) 
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Table 12.6. Ochs and Schieffelin’s (1989) classificatory grid, abbreviated for the Linguistic expression of affect 
relevant to our data set (see also, Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 97). 
 
Level of analysis: Type of cue: 
vocal features loudness 
voice quality lengthening 
stress 
morphosyntax pronouns: the use of third person pronouns to refer to the 
addressee 
lexicon interjections 
descriptive terms for humans 
discourse structure affective speech acts: 
laments 
threats 
exclamations 
 
complex and multimodal semiotic construction of relational meaning. From an 
interactional perspective the analytical focus thus lies on the external emotional 
‘representations’ in communicative moves (see Pfänder and Gülich 2013), rather than on 
the ‘internal’ psychological or neuropsychological research perspective on how people 
emote and feel (e.g. Bänziger and Scherer 2010). These insights suggest that in the analysis 
of any communicative act of relational work, the set of emotional signals that accompany 
such messages should be considered. This invites multimodal analyses of ‘speech acts’ 
(see, e.g. Goodwin et al. 2002; Matoesian 2005) rather than traditional linguistic 
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analyses of the verbal structure of communicative acts alone. Research on emotional 
displays in psychology used to focus on facial expressions. Most prominently, Ekman and 
his colleagues argued for a universal set of six basic emotions that are automatically 
displayed in highly similar ways and recognized with a considerable degree of accuracy 
across cultures (Ekman 1992, 2003; Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978). This limitation of 
emotional expression to the face and a presupposed set of basic emotions has been 
criticized and contested in communication studies (e.g. Planalp 1998, 1999) and linguistic 
anthropology (e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2011; Enfield and Wierzbicka 2002; Pavlenko 2002; 
Wilce 2009). This literature has demonstrated the multimodality, performativity and 
cultural relativity of emotion concepts and corresponding emotional expressions. In 
addition, coding schemes for facial (Ekman and Friesen 1978), vocal (Goodwin et al. 2002; 
Reber 2012), verbal (Fiehler 2002; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989; Schwarz-Friesel 2007) and 
bodily cues (Streeck 2009) exist. But these coding schemes primarily concentrate on one 
communicative modality. Hence, Planalp’s assessment from 1998 regarding the lack of 
integration of these findings into a coherent model is still valid: 
 
Even though researchers tend to study amputated heads, decapitated bodies, disembodied 
and content-free voices, and decontextualized words, we know that in some way they go 
together. What is singularly lacking is any plausible account of how cues are combined into 
complex multichannel messages about emotion, much less accounts of how they are 
produced and interpreted. (Planalp 1998, p. 37) 
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In more recent linguistic work, interesting frameworks have been proposed to chart the 
multimodal dimensions of emotional signalling (e.g. Fiehler 2002; Wilce 2009). But only 
very few studies—mostly from the fields of conversation analysis, praxeology and 
anthropological linguistics—have actually investigated the dynamics of this multimodality 
in actual embodied practices of relational work (Goodwin and Goodwin 2001; Goodwin et 
al. 2002; Matoesian 2005; Pepin 2008). In line with these multimodal interactional 
perspectives, Langlotz and Locher (2013) have proposed a framework for analysing 
emotional signalling in relational work. Their model is rooted in Clark’s (1996) theory of 
language use. He proposes that interactors do not merely encode meanings into symbolic 
units but rather engage in complex processes of multimodal signalling for describing, 
indexing and demonstrating their stances to one another. Moreover, Clark highlights that 
the creation of meaning is achieved by joint actions in which the speaker and the listener 
simultaneously play active roles. Joint processes of emotional signalling serve the semiotic 
construction and management of relational meaning between 
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the interactional partners. The interactional partners employ multimodal emotional 
displays to perform complex communicative acts of social sanctioning and moral coding. 
From an interactional perspective it is therefore necessary to focus on the interactional 
design as well as the recipient take-up of communicative moves with a socioemotional 
impact. Both the signalled emotional values and their reception are claimed to be essential 
for discursively modulating interpersonal relationships. When analysing interactions, 
researchers are faced with a dynamic activation of the repertoire of emotional cues. While 
conspicuous emotional displays may be absent, interactors can also become entangled in 
emotional ‘interaction chains’, i.e. emotions which trigger further emotions. Furthermore, 
interactants may make rhetorical/strategic use of emotional cues. 
Emotional cues play a central role in the immediate communication of emotion and 
interpersonal supportiveness, as highlighted by Arndt and Janney (1985). Thus, they 
belong to the social side of emotionality. However, as outlined below, emotions also have 
a personal side. Through such cues a recipient can make judgements or hypotheses about 
this personal side. However, in many cases to move beyond the level of emotional stance 
and to know what another person really feels, we depend on his or her explicit description 
or meta-comments. Along these lines, Culpeper et al. (2014) have proposed an analytical 
framework to compare intercultural differences in the emotional reactions to impolite 
communicative situations. Locher and Koenig (2014) and Locher (2017) have also analysed 
emotional meta-comments by medical students reflecting on how they experienced their 
relationships to and interactions with patients (e.g. some students reported on their fear 
of coming across as impolite and rude). Meta-comments thus allow us to gain post hoc 
access to the feeling states experienced by interactors in relational episodes. 
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5. Sketching paths for empirical analysis 
 
With regard to the dimensions outlined above, researchers of (im)politeness can refer 
to the following toolbox of analytical concepts presented in Table 12.7 when analysing the 
link between (im)politeness and emotion in actual interaction.  
While we lack the space to present detailed empirical work, we will briefly sketch the 
analysis of a Monty Python’s Flying Circus (series 2, episode 5, 1970) clip of a shop 
interaction building on what we presented in Table 12.4 as a sequential model for the 
social side of emotional processes (Transcript 1). 
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The humorous scene shows a shop assistant and a customer interacting with each other 
in a butcher’s shop; however, the interaction does not follow the to-be-expected script.  
Transcript (1): Monty Python’s Flying Circus: Live from the Grill-O-Mat, The Man Who 
is Alternately Rude and Polite (series 2, episode 5, 1970). 
Setting: Butcher’s shop; shop assistant (SA) behind counter; customer (C) in front of 
the counter. 
 
1 C: [friendly smile] Good morning, I’d care to purchase a chicken, please. 
2 SA: [looking 
unfriendly] 
Don’t come here with that posh talk you nasty, stuck-up twit. 
3 C: [puzzled look] I beg your pardon? 
4 SA: [friendly smile] A chicken, sir. Certainly. 
5 C: [friendly smile] Thank you. And how much does that work out to per pound, my 
good fellow? 
6 SA: [looking grim] Per pound, you slimy trollop, what kind of a ponce are you? 
7 C: [puzzled look] I’m sorry? 
8 SA: [friendly smile] 4/6 a pound, sir, nice and ready for roasting. 
9 C: [friendly smile] I see, and I’d care to purchase some stuffing in addition, please. 
10 SA: [looking grim] Use your own, you great poofy poonagger! 
11 C: [puzzled look] What? 
12 SA: [friendly smile] Ah, certainly sir, some stuffing. 
13 C: [friendly smile] Oh, thank you. 
14 SA: [looking grim] ‘Oh, thank you’ says the great queen like a la-di-dah poofta. 
15 C: [puzzled look] I beg your pardon? 
16 SA: [friendly smile] That’s all right, sir, call again. 
17 C: [friendly smile] Excuse me. 
18 SA: [looking grim] What is it now, you great pillock? 
19 C: [no longer smiling] Well, I can’t help noticing that you insult me and then you’re polite 
to me alternately. 
20 SA: [friendly smile] I’m terribly sorry to hear that, sir. 
21 C: [friendly smile] That’s all right. It doesn’t really matter. 
22 SA: [looking grim] Tough titty if it did, you nasty spotted prancer. 
 
In transcript 1 the text in bold shows the expected interaction for shop encounters in 
England, which is carried out with a positive emotional orientation to each other indicated 
by the accompanying friendly smiles and the careful and respectful choice of vocabulary. 
Intervening between the turns, we find breaches of the expected conduct by the shop 
assistant (this incongruity constituting the source of the humour; Attardo 1994). In 
contrast to the expected response, the shop assistant breaks the frame of the shop 
interaction by insulting the customer. The visibly puzzled customer reacts by stating ‘I beg 
your pardon?’ and immediately receives a perfectly adequate response to the original 
request. The reassured customer returns to the activity frame of the shop interaction by 
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voicing the next request, only to be at the receiving end of more insults. This pattern is 
repeated several times. In line 17, the customer moves the interaction to a discussion of 
appropriateness and uses meta-pragmatic comments to express his puzzlement about the 
alternation of insults with polite behaviour. In what follows, we will make selective 
comments on the analytical dimensions in Table 12.7 with reference to salient instances 
in this sketch. We intend to illustrate the potential for interpersonal pragmatic research 
rather than providing a detailed analysis. 
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A number of emotions seem to play a role in the transaction. The shop assistant 
expresses contempt for the customer and directs his anger against his interactional 
partner (2). These negative emotions are immediately followed by the seller’s shift to a 
state of happy support (4). The customer also starts by addressing the shop assistant in a 
positive and happy mood (1, 5, 9, 13), but in reaction to the butcher’s take-up of his 
requests, his emotional state shifts to puzzlement (3, 7, 11, 15) and increasing irritation 
(17). We can perceive the interactors’ emotional stances through the communicative 
observables performed by them. 
With regard to the repertoire of multimodal cues to communicate emotional stance, 
vocal, facial, verbal and body cues seem particularly salient in the sketch. Whenever the 
shop assistant switches from taking a positive and polite stance to taking an aggressive 
and impolite one, this is marked by a change of intonation. While negative stance is 
expressed through more stress and vocal force (e.g. 2), positive stance is mediated through 
the higher pitched voice and rising intonation (e.g. 4). This is usually accompanied by a 
smiling versus grim facial expression, which could be more precisely described by applying 
Ekman and Friesen’s facial action coding system (Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978, see also 
Ekman 2003). The emotional force of the seller’s lexical choices is immediately evident. He 
uses highly offensive, derogatory and negatively connoted membership categorisation 
devices (Sacks 1992). The customer’s reactions primarily show tokens of puzzlement along 
the same dimensions of cues. Interestingly, the customer’s orientation away from and 
towards the shop assistant can also be seen in the former’s upward and downward head 
movements (14–17), which support both avoidance and establishment of eye contact. His 
puzzlement becomes best apparent in the meta-communicative comment he makes in 
(19). 
Concerning the links between these emotional displays and corresponding social rules, 
every adult having been socialised in a British context will immediately recognise that the 
shop assistant breaks the norms of appropriate social conduct in a seller–buyer 
interaction. Of course, this break of convention constitutes the backbone of humour in the 
sketch as the shop assistant breaches both feeling rules and display rules. The 
conventional feeling rule 
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for a seller is: be friendly to your customer and make him/her feel at ease. Obviously, this 
is not the seller’s intention here: He vents his annoyance with the stilted customer in a 
very unrestrained way. In doing so, he also violates emotional display rules. Even if a 
service provider were annoyed with customers or irritated by their behaviour, by 
convention he/she would not be given free lease to express anger and contempt by 
activating the arsenal of negative emotional cues outlined above. Thus, the butcher not 
only breaks the conventional feeling rule of being friendly but also violates the display rule: 
if you don’t like your customer, don’t show your negative attitude. These feeling rules and 
display rules are part of the knowledge we associate with the seller–buyer frame. Their 
violation triggers appraisal processes and emotional reactions. The audience may also 
vicariously experience the hidden pleasure of breaking such rules. 
314 
↓ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published in: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_12 
                                               
7 In other words, we are not, as Kádár and Haugh (2013, p. 225) claim, arguing that emotions only go together 
The client’s meta-comment in (19) directly addresses the shop assistant’s 
communicative oscillation between two frames: (a) seller–buyer talk and (b) abuse. 
Throughout the interaction the frames are cued through typical features such as the bold-
type moves in the transcript, which are conventional for (a). The rapid and unmediated 
switch to (b) comes with a conspicuous change of speech style. Both for the audience of 
the sketch as well as for the protagonists within the fictional setting, these frames 
constitute benchmarks for appraisal processes. On the one hand, as spectators we may 
laugh at the shop assistant’s inappropriate and norm-deviating use of cues and the 
‘schizophrenic’ situation that is evoked through them. The customers’ appraisal, on the 
other hand, is rather characterised by surprise and increasing irritation as he is repeatedly 
faced with the unexpected frame of abuse. 
The relational work conducted by the interactional partners in the sketch here is also 
funny because it plays with the sequentiality of social positioning. Whenever the customer 
attempts to adapt his emotional stance to the shop assistant’s highly unconventional 
impoliteness, the latter changes back to the normal frame and thus puts the customer into 
the sequential offside. While the customer believes that everything is back to normal 
again, he is always one ‘step’ behind throughout the interaction and he does not manage 
to adapt his emotional stance to the outrageous impoliteness. As a result, he stays trapped 
in a state of puzzlement and his reactions do not really succeed in sanctioning the latter’s 
inappropriate behaviour. This ‘pattern’ is even maintained after the customer has asked 
for clarification of the seller’s stance-taking by his meta-comment in (19). Thus, while the 
interaction in the sketch appears to be highly emotional in an unconventional way, the 
emotional displays do not seem to have a direct impact on the way the relationship 
between the interactors is negotiated. Instead of establishing a negative emotional 
contagion 
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chain of abuse and counter-abuse, as would be typical of intense conflict talk (Dersley and 
Wootton 2001), the sketch stages a scene of communicative oscillation. This adds further 
abnormality and incongruity to the sketch. 
 
6. Conclusions and outlook 
 
In this overview of the importance of emotions for the study of (im)politeness and 
interpersonal pragmatics more generally, we have aimed to give background knowledge 
to those not familiar with research on emotions and, on the basis of a short literature 
review, to point out research interfaces that warrant further research. Let us recapitulate 
some of our observations. 
We are not saying that emotions are the same as relations and we are not suggesting 
we should replace the concept of ‘relational work’ with ‘emotional work’. Instead, we want 
to highlight that emotions play a fundamental role in the creation of any type of pragmatic 
meaning, no matter whether there is recognition of intentions or awareness of intentions 
(by S or H).7 We wish to point out the fundamental emotional component in cognitive 
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with recognition of intentions or with awareness of intentions (by S or H). 
appraisals which are at the heart of judgments about appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour (see Locher and Langlotz 2008; Sect. 4.1 on emotions and cognition). Emotions 
thus play an important part in arriving at emic judgements on relational work so that they 
have a clear place in the theoretical arguments of interpersonal pragmatics. 
In line with others (Ruhi 2007, 2009; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Locher 2008; 
Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2011), we claim that emotions are intricately tied to the concepts of 
face and identity construction. While our self-concepts are linked to personal emotions 
that we do not always wish to share with our communicative partners, what we think and 
feel about ourselves is to a very large extent shaped through interaction and the emotional 
stances that our interlocutors express towards us. This is because emotions are directly 
linked to sociality and relationship building. In addition, our understanding of who we are 
and what lines of identity we want to project are fundamentally linked to the 
understanding of rights and obligations of particular situated roles. Being successful or 
unsuccessful in creating identities has emotional consequences that will impact ensuing 
interaction. 
From a phenomenological point of view, we addressed communicative observables of 
emotions. Here we offered a set of lists that might help scholars to identify multimodal 
emotional cues. Emotional stance can thus be signalled 
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in a combination of different modes. However, we are not arguing that analysts can or 
should only work with those cues that can be easily identified in the surface structure of 
communication. Our previous comments about the fundamental nature of emotions for 
cognition and sociality also pave the way for in-depth (critical) discourse analysis that 
engages with the underlying ideologies involving emotions that are behind feeling and 
emotion display rules. As we point out elsewhere (Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 104), 
‘[w]hen scrutinizing naturally-occurring data one also has to be acutely aware of the fact 
that emotional display rules may supress explicit emotional signalling in a given 
interaction’. As a matter of fact, we find data that presents unmarked, smooth interaction 
as interesting as behaviour that is clearly marked as negative or positive. Having said this, 
it is probably safe to say that we can usually only observe the tip of the iceberg of the 
complex and full emotional world of interactants and their potentially different 
interpretations of events and the related emotional components. Nevertheless, ‘those 
emotional orientations that are signalled as well as the striking absence of expected 
emotional displays must be considered to play an important role for the study of relational 
work as a discursive phenomenon’ (Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 105). 
In theory, scholars of (im)politeness could be satisfied with acknowledging the 
fundamental importance of emotions for interpersonal pragmatics and leave it at that. 
This seems to have been the path that many of the early politeness theories have taken 
(with the exception of Arndt and Janney 1985). However, we believe that more research 
efforts in this field are warranted since emotions are such a fundamental part of appraisals 
and of relating and thus also of assessing relational work. Even when we analysts cannot 
always access explicit surface structures or clearly assignable emotional stance, emotions 
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are underlying any human interaction. It is worthwhile studying this quite simply because 
our concepts of ourselves are at stake and we are quite clearly emotionally involved with 
these projections/understandings. We thus suggest that the (im)politeness field can 
benefit from further exploring the link between emotions, identity construction and 
sociality. 
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